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introduction: whose wto is it anyway?
'In human social systems, the most complex systems in the universe, therefore the 
hardest to analyse, the struggle for the good society is a continuing one. Further-
more, it is precisely in periods of transition from one historical system to another 
one (whose nature we cannot know in advance) that human struggle takes on the 
most meaning. Or to put it another way, it is only in such times of transition that 
what we call free will outweighs equilibria. Thus, fundamental change is possible, 
albeit never certain and this fact makes moral claims on our responsibility to act 
rationally, in good faith, and with strength to seek a better historical system.'
–Immanuel Wallerstein, 'Uncertainty and Creativity' (1998:3)
There are good grounds for taking seriously Wallerstein's dictum that the world system has entered what he describes as an interregnum. By 
this he means two important things: First, that the world is moving between 
two forms of world system, from a capitalist world system to something 
new; Second, that in such an interregnum questions of structure become 
less signifi cant than those of agency. The world system is one that has been 
produced, reproduced and will ultimately be transformed by human actors. 
The direction that it takes will be the result of the political struggles that 
ensue in the interregnum. In this paper I examine some of these claims in 
the context of a series of events that have taken place over the past decade 
and in the run up to the protests that occurred in December 1999 at the 
World Trade Organization (WTO) summit in Seattle. In so doing I hope 
to put some empirical fl esh on the bones of the idea that Wallerstein has 
suggestively offered us. While I am critical of important aspects of Waller-
stein's work and that of his cohorts at the Fernand Braudel Center I would 
equally argue that they have presented us with the most powerful and coher-
ent framework for making sense of, I hesitate to use the term given Waller-
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stein's ontological assumptions, international relations. Thus, this paper is 
informed by sympathy with Wallerstein's ideas and an acknowledgement 
that they offer us a rich source of insight into the emergence of the modern 
world order.1 
The aims of any critical social science are four-fold:
• fi rst and foremost to aspire to provide us with an accurate description 
of the events at hand.
• second, to provide us with a plausible explanation for the events.
• third, to offer us a counter-factual analysis where appropriate, setting 
out what alternatives might be possible given existing conditions.
• fi nally, to offer a normative analysis of the events and to defend a nor-
mative position in a reasoned manner.
An explanation of events is a causal analysis and interpretation that 
must focus upon a range of factors. In this sense events are the product of 
the (often complex) relationship between different social structures, causal 
mechanisms and actors in the world order. These can take the form of the 
relations between systemic features such as capitalism and the inter-state 
system as well as such complex interacting causal mechanisms and agents as 
political parties, fi nancial speculators, scientists, the structure of ideas and 
so on.2 This should not, however, be mistaken for a chronic indeterminism. 
The current world order is patterned in a number of important ways which 
suggest that some causal factors outweigh others: global poverty; the con-
tinuing 'interventionism' of the imperialist powers under U.S. hegemony; 
the erosion of the rights and interests of working people. These are all, 
in important senses, outcomes of the interaction of the system, structures, 
agents and causal mechanisms of world order. They are certainly not simply 
contingent or chance occurrences. In a world awash with resources, wealth 
and technology, global poverty is certainly not the product of bad luck. 
In order to make sense of these problems there remains no alternative, 
as Ernest Gellner somewhat ruefully noted, to a rational analysis of these 
issues (Gellner: 1992). We need to understand the causes of these problems 
in order to change them. 
The paper will proceed as follows. In the remainder of this introductory 
section I will discuss a little of what Wallerstein, Arrighi and others mean by 
the idea of anti-systemic movements and why, despite their limitations thus 
far, they remain the only potentially viable source of a new form of global 
solidarity that might seek to challenge the existing world order on progres-
sive lines.3 I will elaborate on and defend this claim in more depth shortly. 
1. At the risk of being accused of conceptual slippage by more sophisticated 
theorists I am quite happy to use the terms world system and world order to signify 
the same thing, a totality of global social relations structured through the organising 
principles of the inter-state system and of global capitalism.
2. It seems that whenever I begin to write something for an international relations 
journal I am condemned to repeat a familiar list of mantra's about causality and systems 
that should really be common sense by now. However, as they are not I will discuss them 
later in the article. For those of an empiricist bent (not the worst sin that one can commit) 
it is the Humean model of causality that has dominated the international relations 
literature, as set out most famously by Waltz's work in neo-realism. The barrenness and 
inapplicability of such a mechanistic and idealised conception of causality for not only 
the social sciences but much of the natural sciences is something that is largely ignored in 
the literature. Even, err, enlightened writers within international relations such as Steve 
Smith still cannot get away from the idea that an interest in causality means that you are 
somehow a 'positivist', or Satanist, whichever is worse. Again, I shall clarify what I mean 
by causality when I turn to the section on systemic analysis. For an example of these 
debates in international relations see David Dessler (1999).
3. Clearly, I am tying my colours to the mast here when I say that anti-systemic 
movements are potentially part of a progressive agenda in global politics. I am not sure 
that Wallerstein would use such a loaded term as 'progressive', he is suspiciously soft on 
postmodernism of late for my liking. Given that a critical social science has to render 
explicit its normative assumptions then these are mine. While the descriptive/empirical 
part of a critical social science is a question of facts, inherently fallible, liable to empirical 
challenge and open to revision, the positive/normative aspect of critical social science is 
a concern with the plausibility and coherence of arguments that are explicitly evaluative. 
The relationship between the two is not entirely divorced, as empiricism would have us 
believe. All social theory is underpinned, for example, by a conception of human nature. 
Nor is the gap between facts about human nature and the values that we should adhere 
to simply open to the logical leaps beloved of Western analytic philosophers such as 
Anthony Quinton (1973). As a consequence this means that most such philosophers 
have nothing of practical utility to say about such matters. For those of us living in the 
real world we are faced with this conundrum on a daily basis and we have to fi nd ways 
of making those leaps between what we think the world is like (facts of the matter) 
and how we think it both could be (counter-factual hypotheses) and how it should be 
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I will then turn to the question of systemic analysis that encourages us to 
think in terms of world order as a totality of global social relations. Now, 
this really is an unpopular idea in contemporary social theory. I can under-
stand the reasons for this, and many of the criticisms made by postmod-
ernists of what they call Grand Narratives are worthy of consideration.4 
However, there is simply no alternative for anti-systemic movements other 
than to have a coherent account of the totalising structure of world order: 
both global capitalism and the inter-state system are totalising forces! They 
cannot be wished away by their critics and so they must be understood if 
they are to be transformed. This does not mean that we should mistake our 
analysis for some kind of infallible truth about how the world is, which I 
think is what such critics of totality are trying to get at. On the contrary, 
our knowledge about systems is always partial, liable to correction and so 
on. I will comment more on this subsequently. Following this I will place 
the events at Seattle in historical context. I interpret the interregnum that 
Wallerstein talks of as arising with the end of the bi-polar aspect of the Cold 
War and the move towards a system of so-called 'global governance', organ-
ised under U. S. hegemony and the international institutional structure that 
conforms to the political-economic interests of, broadly speaking, the G7 
core capitalist states and their corporations. The events at Seattle need to be 
situated in both a long-term and short-term historical context that refl ects 
this movement from Cold War bi-polarity to global governance. I will follow 
this by drawing out the key aspects of continuity and change in world order 
in this period of transition from Cold War to global governance. In conclu-
sion I will comment briefl y on the normative implications of these develop-
ments and how they have called into question a number of the key concepts 
that have grounded Western political theory since the Enlightenment. Just 
to clarify this point, my intention here is to examine these tendencies as 
part of a possible continuation of Enlightenment thought which sought to 
provide reasoned grounds for political practices and institutions. Concepts 
such as solidarity, citizenship, political identity and obligation remain cen-
tral to any anti-systemic challenge to the existing world order. I want to turn 
now to brief synopsis of Seattle and the events surrounding it to explain 
why it is of signifi cance to developments in world order.
Background
'It is hard to know which was worse—watching the militants dress parade their 
ignorance through the streets of Seattle, or listening to their lame-brained gov-
ernments respond to the 'arguments'. No, take that back, the second was worse. 
Let them explain that trade is fi rst and foremost a matter of freedom—that 
if a government forbids its citizens to buy goods from another country it has 
infringed their liberty. (Why were there no 'anarchists' among all those anarchists 
by the way?). Let them explain that trade makes people better off, especially the 
poorest people in the poorest countries. Let them explain that trade improves 
the environment, because it raises incomes. And the richer people are, the more 
willing people are to devote resources to clean up their living space. Let them 
explain that the WTO is not a global government, but merely a place where 
governments make agreements, and then subject themselves to arbitration in the 
event of a dispute.'
–The Economist editorial, 'Clueless in Seattle', 6-12-99
According to the myth, the 'ultra-secretive' WTO has become a sort of super-
governmental body that forces nations to bow to the wishes of MNCs. It destroys 
local cultures,…, it rides roughshod over democracy, forcing governments to 
remove laws that confl ict with its sinister purposes…The raw fact is that every 
successful example of economic development this past century—every case of 
a poor nation that worked its way up to a more or less decent, or at least 
dramatically better standard of living—has taken place via globalisation; that is 
(normative hypotheses). These leaps may rest on intuition, accounts of human nature, 
communitarianism, and so on. This is a vast area of debate in the relatively arid environs 
of academic philosophy, most of which is practically useless (pace Nietzsche, 1973) and 
only ever comes to life when it is transformed into something meaningful by those writers 
actually concerned with the world as it is and its problems. I am thinking here of people 
like Richard Falk, Wallerstein, Amartya Sen, and so on.
4. Sokal and Jean Bricmont (1998). Interestingly, Wallerstein has argued that Sokal 
and Bricmont's response was a poor one because they should have been prepared to 
debate and discuss with the various postmodern writers who had sought to appropriate 
physics, maths and the like in their work. Wallerstein says, 'To take a simple example, would 
it not really have been more useful for someone like Alan Sokal to enter into co-operative discussion 
with those who have been asking real questions about the structures of knowledge, instead of defl ating 
foolish excesses, and thereby making the discussion of the underlying issues more, rather than less, 
diffi cult?', in his 'Liberalism and Democracy', (1998: 101). Again, I think that Wallerstein has 
gotten things the wrong way around here, it is the writers that Sokal and Bricmont have 
criticised who have sought to needlessly (and pretentiously) render analysis of the social 
world obscure. Given the completely inappropriate and incoherent use of the natural 
sciences by these writers one has to wonder exactly what kind of discussion would be 
possible or fruitful. As ever, social theory can either clarify or obscure the nature of social 
relations, that, among others, is the point that Sokal and Bricmont make.
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by producing for the world market rather than trying for self-suffi ciency.'
–Paul Krugman, 'Enemies of the WTO', Slate, 23-11-99
'Second, remember universal brotherhood? You know—concern for the world's 
poor and downtrodden? As Paul Krugman recently noted in Slate, free trade 
gives millions of people a step up the ladder. Yes, that may mean working in a 
sweatshop. But these people manifestly prefer that to their prior condition.'
–Robin Wright, 'We're all one-worlder's now', Slate, 23-12-99
To understand the importance of the events at Seattle it is instructive 
to turn one's attention to the world's business press.5 The above quotes are 
not unrepresentative of the kind of response that the protests at Seattle elic-
ited, spanning the spectrum from hysteria (Wright, who I will turn to at 
the end of this piece) to righteous indignation (just about everyone else!). 
Krugman's somewhat misleading claim that the only successful developing 
states have been trading states working in accord with free market principles 
is but one snapshot of the way in which intelligent people can deny history 
with barely a shrug of the shoulders. Needless to say he does not mention 
which states are the examples of 'successful' development, and for good rea-
sons. There aren't any. Outside of city-states (i. e. not real states) such as 
Hong Kong and Singapore, there are no examples that appear to offer much 
by way of empirical support to neo-liberal theory. I appreciate that with 
the kind of idealisations beloved of econometrics that empirical reality has 
a nasty habit of getting in the way of parsimonious theory and abstract 
hypotheses but there you are, the world does have a way of forcing us to face 
up to facts (Lawson, 1997; Fleetwood, 1999). It is conceivable that Krugman 
means trading states like Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea (I am trying to 
be generous here) but a cursory glance at the historical record shows that 
they are nothing like models of free market principles. On the contrary, they 
represent state-led and directed models of development!(Amsden, 1989; 
Harris, 1986). The question remains then, as to why the business press 
responded with such vehemence to the Seattle protests? After all, isn't it just 
another little protest of a kind we have seen on countless occasions before? 
Perhaps, and yet as I will argue there may well be more to Seattle as part of 
a wider series of anti-systemic protests than might initially be suspected.
In order to understand this and as I will subsequently show, Seattle 
is part of a longer series of protests and the development of anti-systemic 
movements since their emergence in the late 1960s, largely in response to 
what Wallerstein describes as the failures of older statist political ideolo-
gies: conservatism, liberalism and socialism. The World Trade Organisation 
(WTO) as the successor institution to the General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade (GATT) is both a symbolic and practical manifestation of the 
way in which power has shifted in the era of global governance, or the 'New 
World Order' as it is often described. As the world's foremost institution 
concerned with the rules and regulations of international trade the WTO 
is the crucial site of global trade policy formation and decision-making in 
the new millennium. Established in 1995, the WTO is an effective interna-
tional organisation, unusually so. Its procedures for settling trade disputes 
are binding on all parties and it is in the process of dealing with over 100 
cases. The disciplinary mechanisms that the WTO possesses to use against 
those members guilty of breaking its rules are geared towards protecting the 
interests of the most powerful members, the group of Japan, the EU, Canada 
and the USA. In truth it is the USA that benefi ts most from these rules and 
this has been illustrated in some of its trade disputes with the EU in the 
past few years. The rules of the WTO enable the injured party to retaliate 
against the guilty member by imposing punitive sanctions of their own, even 
in an area of trade unrelated to the specifi c case brought before the WTO. 
Thus, the USA can retaliate against the EU's banana agreement with the 
ACP countries by imposing tariffs on Scottish cashmere! Such a system is 
fi ne if you are a powerful member of the WTO, with plenty of potential 
weapons at your disposal. It is less helpful if your economy is less diverse. 
 In theory, then, the WTO is an institution which as Clare Short, the 
UK minister for Trade and Overseas Development noted, 'provides the fi rst 
forum for trade negotiations where developing countries are in a majority. This gives 
them a chance to negotiate fairer trading arrangements. Those who want to tear down 
5.  The Business press tends to be staffed by what we might reasonably call, trying to 
keep in the spirit of Wallerstein, ideological system managers, those who have to propose 
ways to either make the system work (only in theory, of course!) or explain why it has 
temporarily broken down. The underlying theme is either an optimistic one (normal 
service will be resumed as soon as possible), which is always bad news for those on the 
receiving end; or apocalyptic (the end of capitalism is the end of civilisation, when in fact 
if we are lucky it might just be the beginning).
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the WTO diminish that chance.' (Short, 1999). In practice, it is an institution 
that is unsurprisingly dominated by the USA, the EU, Japan and Canada. It 
is not that Clare Short's comment is wilfully misleading. Alright, perhaps it 
is a little, but what is most signifi cant is that it fails to recognise the way in 
which social power is exercised in these institutions. This is itself a familiar 
failure of the kind of pluralist view of power that links the analysis of both 
Paul Krugman and Clare Short. In practice, trade negotiation, like global 
capitalism itself, is akin to a form of warfare (Kanth, 1999: 194). The con-
sensus that emerges is a product of the exercise of various forms of power 
by the dominant parties. As Vandana Shiva has written, 'trade ministers from 
Asia, Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean were responding politically when they 
refused to join hands to provide support to a 'contrived' consensus since they had been 
excluded from the negotiations being undertaken in the 'green room' process behind 
closed doors' (Shiva, 2000). This does not mean that the WTO is a 'secret 
government', as Krugman seems to think that its critics are saying. (Some 
might be, he doesn't name anyone, so it is hard to tell). On the contrary, what 
it does reveal is something familiar to any undergraduate student of politics, 
that international negotiations tend to favour the powerful states and their 
representatives who have the most resources and greatest levers to bring to 
bear on potential opponents. The 'Green Door' facility of the WTO exists 
so that 'key' actors can meet to resolve trade disputes, sometimes as few as 
two or three states' representatives. Krugman and other commentators have 
to face up to the reality of politics in the current world order and have some 
account of the fact that political processes are invariably struggles about 
power and ideas between groups opposed on diverse social faultlines: class, 
gender, ethnicity, and so on. In the power-free world of neo-liberal ideology 
such issues are expunged from analysis where they only serve to muddy the 
picture of how best to reach a technical agreement on making sure that 
capitalism works as smoothly as a well-oiled machine.6 The fact that anti-
systemic groups do not share this vision of the good society, that they don't 
necessarily think that global capitalism and the inter-state system are simply 
machines that need to be modifi ed, is a form of analysis so far removed 
from the reifi ed reality of the 'Washington Consensus' that it is safer for the 
latter to ignore rather than respond to such arguments. The reason that I 
am making these points is to illustrate that the disagreement between anti-
systemic movements and the institutions that serve to structure world order 
takes place on four levels: descriptive, explanatory, counter-factual, and nor-
mative
The WTO is a crucial institution because it is both symbolically and 
practically representative of the ways in which global capitalism and the 
inter-state system have become intertwined. Thus, it is seen as perfectly 
'normal' that private corporate interests should quite literally be able to buy 
6.  To be fair to Paul Krugman he is a Keynesian although the extent to which 
this means he is outside of the framework of neo-liberalism is problematic. If he simply 
means that trade per se is a route to economic growth/development, then that is perfectly 
reasonable, so long as we remember that trade is never free and is about the power 
of states and corporations to construct and run the system in their interests. For an 
account of Krugman's work as a 'gadfl y' challenging the common-sense complacency of 
mainstream economic theory see Edward S. Herman (2000). As for Clare Short, she is 
part of a social-democratic government that have consistently espoused a commitment 
to key aspects of neo-liberal ideology for some time. Robin Ramsey (1998). I think that 
this argument is a little too deterministic (heh! heh!) and that there is plenty of evidence 
to suggest that important sections of the Labour government hierarchy actually believe 
in these ideas, which is probably an even worse admission. Just to show what an impartial 
social scientist I am I have to disagree with Wallerstein (1995; 'Social science and 
contemporary society', 1998) here and his claims that liberalism has had its day and that 
neo-liberalism has little conceptual clarity. Neo-liberalism is a series of ideas that has its 
roots in liberal thought but which deviates in crucial and important ways. See Kenneth 
Hoover and Raymond Plant (1985). Ian Gilmour (1992). Given the limits of space, neo-
liberalism can be condensed (hard-boiled) to a few simple premises and policies: a mix 
of policies of privatisation, liberalisation, deregulation and protectionism that work to 
serve the interests of powerful states and companies wherever possible, although there is 
always the potential for contradictions and confl icts of interest here, which is where the 
anti-systemic movements have some leverage. The embedding of the principle of public 
subsidy for private profi t is a central premise of the normal workings of actually existing 
capitalism. Actually existing capitalists do not want free trade, of course, what they want 
is a war that they can win. The core capitalist states support their major corporate actors 
in myriad ways and through various policy devices. Finally, neo-liberalism is quite simply 
class war on a global scale, an attempt by the dominant economic and political classes, 
though often for quite different reasons, to try to defend the interests of core state 
corporations against the demands of labour. So Wallerstein is wrong, liberalism is not on 
the way out just yet and nor is neo-liberalism a meaningless concept!
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seats at the negotiating table with trade ministers and the like, presumably 
on the assumption that whatever is in the interest of these private compa-
nies is somehow akin to the public interest. How we have arrived at such a 
situation is another story that has been developed by a number of important 
writers such as Stephen Gill (1991) and Kees Van Der Pijl (1998). There 
is a welter of information on the WTO and how it works in theory and in 
practice and I would refer interested readers to the following sources (Khor, 
1999).7 In closing the introductory section we need to consider the question 
of who these so-called anti-systemic movements really are.
Wallerstein, Arrighi and Hopkins fi rst coined the term anti-systemic 
movements in their eponymous work of 1989, an apposite moment to be 
writing about challenges to world order. Historically anti-systemic move-
ments are located in the world wide revolutionary movements of the late 
1960s (1968 to be over precise) and the issues that they brought to the 
forefront of political concern. For Wallerstein, et al, these movements repre-
sent more than the arrival of new concerns onto the political agenda. 
More deeply, the issues of sexism and racism have been crucial ideological 
tools in the perpetuation of the world order, dividing potential opposition 
forces against each other: men/women, black/white, when in fact all have 
an interest in transforming existing global social relations.8 Anti-systemic 
movements have sought to construct new forms of social and political 
organisation that would challenge both the existing order and previous 
forms of political organisation that were inherently statist and had proven 
unable to deal with the problems of what is a world system (to use Waller-
stein's term). Thus, according to Wallerstein, social democracy and Bolshe-
vism alike were fl awed anti-systemic forces that could offer us no route to 
the good society, based as they were around either national consciousness 
(social democrats) or privileged consciousness (we know best! Bolshevism) 
(Arrighi, Hopkins, Wallerstein, 'Dilemmas of Anti-systemic movements', 
1989). However fragmented and problematic for Wallerstein and his col-
leagues, an alternative world order remains dependent upon the outcomes of 
anti-systemic movements. These groups have clearly developed apace since 
the 1960s, in Europe through the peace movements and anti-nuclear pro-
tests, as well as through a variety of what are now called New Social Move-
ments. Tentatively, these groups have sought to link up with others around 
the world and the development of these links can be seen in a number of 
events in the 1980s and 1990s that I will turn to later. In general terms I am 
in agreement with the claim of Wallerstein and World Systems analysis that 
anti-systemic movements represent challenges to the existing world order. 
However, they also raise a number of ethical and political problems that 
cannot easily be brushed aside and these issues too will need to be addressed 
later. Encouragingly, events at Seattle actually gave many practical examples 
of the ways in which protesters sought to overcome their varied differences. 
 7.  For more on the nature of negotiating principles such as the ‘necessary’ use of 
the ‘Green room’ to secure consensus at the WTO see its unintentionally hilariously 
titled web-site article, ‘Whose WTO is it anyway?’, http://www.wto.org/wto/about/
organsm1.htm. Some interesting facts that give some sense of the balance of power at the 
WTO:
i. The USA has over 250 negotiators at the WTO in Geneva. 30 of the remaining 
134 members of the WTO cant afford to base anyone at the WTO in Geneva, let 
alone afford the costs of expensive trade lawyers to help set out and defend their 
position on global trade. 
ii. The USA has fi led 30% of all disputes with the WTO, winning 90% of them. 3/4 
of the membership have fi led 1/5 of the complaints.
iii. Decision-making at the WTO is dominated by the quad countries: The USA, the 
European Union, Japan and Canada, all of whose trade representatives work closely 
with their respective corporate representatives.
iv. Corporate sponsorship of the Seattle summit gained access to various ministers 
and meetings for private companies, with a sliding scale in accord with the size of 
your donations.
For more details see the World Development Movement, ( 1999); Russell Mokhiber 
and Robert Weissmann (26-10-99) who note that corporations paid $9-10 million (US) 
of the costs of funding the Seattle summit.
 This does not mean that racism and sexism, for example, are simply created under the 
twin structures of the modern world order (global capitalism and the inter-state system). 
Merely that the modern world order has been built in part through the perpetuation and 
deepening of these forms of oppression.
 Wallerstein has recently written that we should abandon the ‘quest for universals’. 
See ‘The heritage of sociology, the promise of social science’, Wallerstein, 1998). On new 
ideas about solidarity see NACLA (March/April 1994/95).
8.  This does not mean that racism and sexism, for example, are simply created 
under the twin structures of the modern world order (global capitalism and the inter-
state system). Merely that the modern world order has been built in part through the 
perpetuation and deepening of these forms of oppression.
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I am tempted to say eureka! here in the face of those who have argued that 
solidarity breaks down upon the unbridgeable boundaries of culture, civili-
sation, or some such thing. What Seattle tentatively suggests is that contrary 
to the claims of those who would decry Enlightenment ideas of universal-
ity and solidarity, in practise it is possible for people to communicate shared 
and differing concerns, perhaps even to discuss ways in which organisation 
might occur around them,9 as in this quote from one of the topless Santa 
Cruz Lesbian Avengers at the Seattle protests: 'When we got here, the steel-
workers weren't very queer-friendly. As the week wore on, they got more comfortable 
with us. My nipples stand in solidarity with the steelworkers and the Teamsters and 
all the labouring peoples (Henwood, 3-12-99). Interestingly, Wallerstein him-
self is more than a little sniffy about the Enlightenment (eurocentrism) and 
its legacy, something that he shares with postmodernists, poststructuralists 
and the like. I think that the reasons for these views are fl awed and that it 
is entirely wrong to junk the Enlightenment and its commitment to prog-
ress, concepts of the good society and the like. Without them anti-systemic 
movements are depriving themselves of the intellectual and conceptual tools 
needed to understand the systemic properties of world order and are also 
denying themselves a rich and varied series of normative writings about the 
good society. The libertarian potential of the Enlightenment is a rich stream 
and one which anti-systemic movements have often illustrated a practical 
if not theoretical commitment to. This will suffi ce for the moment by way 
of introducing anti-systemic movements. What they share in common is a 
desire to challenge fundamental oppressive properties of the existing world 
order. What is needed now is clarifi cation of what is meant by a systemic 
analysis of world order and what this means in practical terms. In so doing 
we can offer an explanation as to why the events at Seattle took place.
i. systemic analysis and world order
'I distrust all systematisers—they lack integrity! '
–Nietzsche, Twilight of the Idols
One of the legacies of the revolutions of 1968 has been the rise of what 
is often described as postmodernism or poststructuralism. Although those 
writers often associated with these approaches to social theory often deny 
that there is a coherent post-modern/structuralist approach, it is reason-
able to note that one thing that such writers do share in common is a hostil-
ity to what are described as either 'Grand Narratives' or 'totalising theory' 
(Lawson and Appignanesi, 1989; Eagleton, 2-3-2000; Herman, 1-96). By 
this is meant hostility to social theories that provide us with a 'theory of 
everything'. Such hostility is based upon the track record of Marxism, Lib-
eralism, Science, or any other of a number of theories that have helped to 
shape the rise of the modern world. More generally, such critical approaches 
hold varying levels of hostility to the Enlightenment and its aspiration to 
establish universal grounds for understanding both the natural and the 
social world which are based on reasoned analysis (Henwood, 1-96).10 In 
practical terms the acceptance of such a critique presents major problems 
for those seeking to defend a systemic analysis of world order. The idea that 
social relations can be viewed in systemic terms is associated with the idea of 
a science of society and the kind of social engineering that postmodernists 
and the like are so hostile to.11 
The problem with these developments in social theory and the impact 
that they are having on both international relations as a discipline and the 
practical problems that they present to anti-systemic movements is that 
in some sense systemic analysis is unavoidable for those wishing to gain an 
understanding of world order. If we accept that both capitalism and the 
inter-state system are the dominant forces that have shaped the modern 
world order then we have to study them as they manifest themselves, that is, 
as systems. Capitalism and the inter-state system are 'totalising' forces that 
have been central to the construction of the modern world order and any 
analysis that does not attempt to understand these systems will be lacking in 
explanatory power. So what does this mean in practical terms? Capitalism 
9. Wallerstein has recently written that we should abandon the 'quest for universals'. 
See 'The heritage of sociology, the promise of social science', Wallerstein, 1998). On new 
ideas about solidarity see NACLA (March/April 1994/95).
10.  See Terry Eagleton on what he calls 'bad universalism' and 'bad particularism', 
'Op. Cit.'
11.  The biggest problem for such critiques of totalising theory is that they tend 
in practice to move between a false dichotomy of either methodological individualism 
or a form of structuralism which reduces the subject to the effect of regimes of truth, 
language games, discourses, and the like.
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and the inter-state system are just that, historical systems, with a beginning 
and subsequent development and presumably, at some point in time, as with 
all hitherto historical systems, an ending. As systems they possess organis-
ing principles and structures that have to be understood. It is the principles 
and practises that make capitalism the system that it is, the specifi c proper-
ties that distinguish it from other forms of social and economic organisa-
tion. Likewise for the inter-state system. Taken together they can be seen 
as the organising frameworks for the global social relations that compose 
world order. By social relations I mean the institutions and relations that 
serve to structure and pattern social life: from the family and the household 
through to the state and corporations. All of these institutions help to struc-
ture and organise the ways in which we live and the ideas that come to 
form the common sense understanding of how we should live. For example, 
the idea that markets are somehow a natural phenomena is a good illustra-
tion of the way in which common sense ideas form to underpin an existing 
set of social relations that connect peoples at a local, national, regional and 
global level. Thus, a systemic analysis is a qualitative analysis that attempts 
to understand the organising principles of particular historical systems, that 
is, the properties and practices that make them one thing rather than some-
thing else. Capitalism, for example, is not feudalism, precisely because it 
involves different forms of social and economic organisation, different rules, 
principles and practices. Without wishing to go into a lengthy treatise here 
on the history of capitalism, it is suffi cient to note the following qualities 
that can be seen as being intrinsic to both capitalism and the inter-state 
system: 
(a) Capitalism 
A socio-economic system organised around the endless accumulation of 
capital/profi t; the private ownership of the means of production; a global 
division of labour; and the establishment of social relations organised pri-
marily but not exclusively around distinct classes (thus important divisions 
in a capitalist world order also includes those of gender and ethnicity).
(b) The Inter-State System 
A system organised around state sovereignty; the state as the highest 
source of legally recognised political authority in a given territory and over 
a given population (the nation/s); the (nation)-state as the basis for politi-
cal identity; inter-state relations built around a hierarchy of power that we 
can realistically describe as imperialism; and the state as the legitimate user 
of force over a given territory. Taken together they provide the framework 
within which and against anti-systemic movements have developed.
While these are systems that can be described in an indeterminate 
number of ways, the same as any other aspect of empirical inquiry, it is also 
the case that not all descriptions are equally persuasive. The task is to estab-
lish the best description and explanation of what these systems are and how 
they work. An analysis of historical systems has to be able to move from 
abstract theorising about systemic properties to concrete analysis which 
illustrates the way in which these properties manifest themselves in practice. 
While there are, no doubt, endless stories to be told about capitalism and 
the inter-state-system, it would be a serious error to assume that all stories 
are equally plausible. They are not, simply, because they are checked by the 
objective quality of existing social relations. Facts about the social world do 
act as a check on the plausibility of theories. As I mentioned earlier, the per-
sistence of global poverty in a world of material abundance is a fact that can 
be explained in terms of the relations between systemic properties, institu-
tions and agents in concrete situations, or it could be explained as being an 
example of existential bad luck. Surely no one seeking to address such prob-
lems would want to deny the superiority of the former position?
Ultimately, then, these are historical systems with rules, regulations, 
institutions and mechanisms that attempt to impose some conception of 
both order and 'normality' upon the world. By order I am referring to the 
patterns of social, economic and political life. By normality I am referring to 
the values and beliefs that underpin such order.12 To talk in terms of systems 
is to recognise, with Wallerstein, that we are talking about historical systems 
that have been produced, reproduced and transformed by people over time 
and space. This is a fl uid and dynamic system that has evolved and which 
changes in response to the struggles between confl icting groups within 
it—e.g. From Keynesianism to Neo-Liberalism is an important shift in the 
post-war world order affecting political ideology, the functions and forma-
12. This does not mean that everyone shares those values, simply that the major 
structuring institutions in world order defend them.
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tions of states, capital-labour relations, gender and race relations, and so on. 
As such these are real historical systems that have a partially enduring qual-
ity and stability over time. For example, the UK State has institutional and 
procedural qualities that date back over many decades and connect the past 
with the present. At the same time it also has properties and practices that 
are new and quite different from properties and practices of both decades 
ago and from more recent times. To illustrate, 100 years ago the UK State 
did not fund free higher education for those qualifi ed to attend such institu-
tions. Twenty years ago it did. Today it does not. It is still recognisable as the 
UK State but many of its specifi c practices have changed and continue to 
do so, often in a reactionary manner. There is both continuity and change 
in such social institutions. The point that I am making here is ultimately a 
simple one, historical systems such as capitalism and the inter-state system 
cannot simply be wished or described away any more than hunger, poverty 
or ill health can. Again, to illustrate, describing poverty as 'social exclusion' 
does little to alter the immediate material circumstances facing those on the 
receiving end of poverty. Those anti-systemic movements moved to organise 
the protests at Seattle have sought to address these systemic properties at 
both the macro and the micro level, which seems to be a wholly sensible and 
necessary manoeuvre given the nature of the systems they confront.13 
Of course, there is always a danger of reifying systems, institutions and 
social relations as Marxists, feminists, postmodernist, critical theorists, and 
the like quite rightly observe. But in some respects it is almost impossible to 
avoid a degree of reifi cation when analysing systems as it requires, in part, 
a commitment to some form of abstract analysis (Tilly, 'Cities and states in 
world history', 1997). The key is to attempt to locate these abstract systemic 
properties in their concrete manifestations, as events at Seattle illustrate so 
starkly. In dealing with historical systems we are dealing with systems that 
have evolved over time, been developed and changed by both human agency 
and the institutions that order social relations, and which ultimately trans-
form the way we live. 
For those anti-systemic movements concerned with the hierarchies of 
social power that shape world order the task is to attempt to understand 
the ways in which capitalism and the inter-state system have benefi ted from 
and helped to perpetuate the racist and sexist ideologies that have been 
instrumental to the rise of the modern world order. More fundamentally 
still, I would suggest, anti-systemic movements need to understand the ways 
in which class alliances among political, economic and military elites have 
evolved and transformed in the course of the C20. This has led to the cur-
rent situation which sees an intra-class confl ict among the world's elites, 
broadly separated into those with a more transnational outlook to global 
governance and those who root themselves more fi rmly in nationally based 
institutions. The latter groups can be viewed as being those interested in the 
politics of cultural nationalism and this can take many forms in response 
to changes in the global political economy. The success of the anti-systemic 
movements depends upon their ability to co-ordinate their activities at a 
number of levels: local, national, regional and global. Cultural nationalist 
groups can often be viewed as those political and cultural groups appealing 
to an idealised past of social harmony and certainty and are often hostile to 
the anti-systemic movements.14 For example, the Women's movement and 
the Peace movement have both been vilifi ed by reactionary institutions and 
social movements for being the progenitors of much of the ills of contem-
porary society (Franco, 1996: 6-9; Vargas, 1992). More broadly, for cultural 
nationalists the 1960s are often held up as a decade that pitched the world 
into a moral decline from which it has yet to recover. It is this issue that I 
want now to turn as I address the signifi cance of the WTO protests at Seat-
tle in an historical context. A failure to recognise the relationship between 
systemic properties and concrete outcomes can lead anti-systemic move-
13. One of the foremost advocates of what is often termed 'methodological 
individualism', the idea that all explanations of social phenomena can ultimately be 
explained by being reduced to the sum of individual actions, actually gives quite good 
grounds for a systemic analysis in a debate with the neuroscientist John Eccles. Karl 
Popper said, ‘…, occur without any conspiracy's being responsible for them, and even when everyone 
involved does not want them to happen.' In Fons Elders (1974: 72). This is precisely the reason 
why anti-systemic movements need both a macro and micro level analysis - to focus on 
the systems that generate unwanted outcomes, overproduction and underconsumption in 
a capitalist world order, for example, as well as the specifi c institutions and agents who are 
responsible for particular decision, polices, problems, and so on. The macro-micro debate 
in social science is surely a dead issue if anything is. I would hope.
14. In Britain the emergence in the past three years of 'The Countryside Alliance' 
refl ects just this kind of cultural nationalist ideology.
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ments to focus their critique upon the wrong targets. Thus, for example, 
since the Seattle protests the AFL-CIO has been arguing for the protec-
tion of 'American' jobs. At the same time in Europe there has been a recent 
upturn in hostility to some sections of the immigrant community. Neither 
protectionism nor anti-immigration racist legislation will do anything to 
alter the systems themselves and thus the deeper causes of the crises that 
have affl icted the global economy and the inter-state system will remain.
ii. seattle in historical context
The question of historical understanding that I want to set out here 
draws upon ideas from both Braudel and subsequently Wallerstein on the 
nature of short-term and long-term historical change. In this respect there 
are two key events that are important in any understanding of Seattle and 
its signifi cance. The fi rst of these is the legacy of the revolutions of 1968; 
the second is the meaning of the end of the Cold War and the movement 
towards a system of 'global governance'. Braudel and Wallerstein present 
us with different understandings of social time, and I want to contrast 
here what can be called diachronic and synchronic understandings of histor-
ical change (Braudel, 1980, 1993; Smith, 1991). To be concerned with dia-
chronic change is to focus upon long-term structural continuity and change 
and the evolution of particular historical systems while to focus upon the 
synchronic is to be concerned with the world of immediate events. A mean-
ingful analysis of Seattle will attempt to situate it in both contexts: it is an 
immediate event but one tied to a series of developments in world order that 
can only be understood through a longer historical perspective. As with so 
many examples, the spontaneity of Seattle was a long time coming. I want to 
begin by turning to the diachronic context in which Seattle emerges.
The Legacy of 1968
Understanding global social change in diachronic terms means an 
attempt to describe and trace the structures, practices, institutions and 
mechanisms of particular historical systems that, in turn, generate the social 
relations that persist over time and space. These connect local, national, 
regional and global social relations. There are two features of such an analy-
sis that are of particular importance for an understanding of Seattle and 
its signifi cance for global social change. The fi rst of these is the legacy of 
the 1968 revolutions that brought a range of previously underexamined or 
secondary forms of oppression to the forefront of politics. The second is 
the apparent 'end of the Cold War', or at least, certain aspects of the Cold 
War, and the movement in the 1990s towards what is described as an era of 
'global governance.'
Dealing with the 1968 legacy fi rst we can note that the anti-systemic 
movements that emerged in the wake of the 1968 revolutions brought direct 
challenges to the norms and institutions that have served to structure world 
order and sought to challenge the divisions that have shaped world order 
around both gender and race. These movements have developed over the 
subsequent decades, often in fragmented and diverse forms. As Wallerstein, 
Arrighi and Hopkins have noted, these movements have been central to the 
possibility of new forms of global solidarity in opposition to the workings 
of the current world order. In practice, their strengths have also been their 
weaknesses: in bringing previously excluded or marginal issues of oppres-
sion to the fore of political concerns they have widened the reach of opposi-
tional movements and brought a dynamism to the anti-systemic movement. 
At the same time, the concentration on what are often single issues has nar-
rowed the ambition and vision of many of these groups away from wider 
political concerns that focus upon questions of the good society. What Seat-
tle has given glimpses of, as I shall turn to shortly, is the possibility of these 
groups being able to communicate and discuss issues that might potentially 
lead to a common agenda for social change. In short, for a new and meaning-
ful form of solidarity around issues concerned with struggling for a better 
society. The impact of anti-systemic movements can only be evaluated over 
the whole period since they burst onto the scene. As the 1980s and 1990s 
have seen a political backlash against the 'decadence' of the 1960s by right-
wing political coalitions so these anti-systemic movements have been forced 
to organise their activities in a range of extra-parliamentary forms. Seattle is 
part of a series of events that have been building up around the world as part 
of wider anti-systemic opposition to global capitalism and the current work-
ings of the inter-state system: the 1980s Peace movements and dissident 
movements in Eastern Europe, South America, and elsewhere; opposition 
to the Uruguay Round of the GATT; opposition to the North American 
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA); protests at successive UN conferences 
since UNCED in 1993; the Jubilee 2000 campaign; the July 4th anti capi-
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talist protests of 1999; protests over the Multilateral Agreement on Invest-
ment; the World Bank 50th anniversary campaign; the 500th anniversary 
protests over the 'discovery of the America's'; all of these and others are part 
of a stream of events within which Seattle has to be situated. It is hard to 
imagine that the spontaneity of Seattle would have occurred without this 
lineage of previous activism. So how should we evaluate the 1968 legacy for 
anti-systemic movements? I think that it can be usefully summarised as fol-
lows:
The idea that no single group has a privileged access to the idea of 
how social change will occur and what it will lead to is one aspect of the 
1968 legacy. At Seattle disparate groups who might initially be seen to have 
sharply contrasting agendas and norms managed over the course of a week 
to begin to draw out some common points of interest and cooperation 
(Henwood, 12-99). 
Related to the fi rst point is a rejection of what we might call political 
absolutism, the idea that any single political group can claim to speak with 
authority for and on behalf of society as a whole. In political terms such 
a thesis has been most commonly associated with Marxist political parties 
who claim to have the authority to speak on behalf of the working classes. In 
practice, as should be clear to all by now, such a position has tended histori-
cally to lead to perverse and terrible political outcomes. 
The 1968 legacy brings to the fore an expanded notion of the meaning 
of oppression, drawing out the concerns and experiences of groups who his-
torically have struggled to have their voices heard, most obviously women 
and non-white peoples. The challenges to patriarchy, sexism and racism 
have all been important and ongoing legacies of the 1968 revolutions. 
An important issue that has arisen out of this period for anti-systemic 
movements is the need to promote social change through democratic means. 
Again, there are many historical examples of political movements who have 
been at the best suspicious of democracy as a bourgeois concept and which 
have sought to use a variety of tactical and organisational strategies to get 
around this. The well-known 'democratic centralism' of organised Marxist 
parties of various hues is a familiar example of this attempt to pay lip service 
to democracy and dissent. It is seems inconceivable that global social change 
promoted through anti-systemic movements can be built on anything other 
than democratic principles if it is to be genuinely emancipatory. 
However, the legacy of the 1968 revolutions is far from straightforward 
as many of its critics will note. It has also brought to the forefront of political 
organisation the following problems: a fractured opposition, a lack of humil-
ity, an overemphasis on the personal, and a tendency toward rejecting ratio-
nality.
The emergence of New Social Movements (NSM) as they are usually 
described has served to fracture anti-systemic forces that were once at least 
theoretically united in their criticism or opposition to much of the current 
inter-state system and global capitalism. One does not have to search too far 
to fi nd fairly open hostility between many groups among the green, feminist, 
socialist, anarchist and anti-racist movements that have sprung up around 
the world. For the existing institutions and agents who benefi t from the 
hierarchies of power under the current world order there is nothing more 
satisfying than a divided opposition, which in part is why Seattle is poten-
tially of more than simply symbolic importance for anti-systemic move-
ments. It provides a snapshot of the possibility of global solidarity and how 
it might be built by anti-systemic movements of apparently quite disparate 
interests. 
Somewhat perversely the challenge to the authority of largely Marxist 
political parties to speak on behalf of the working class has also had its nega-
tive effects. So-called single-issue groups have developed their own forms of 
epistemological hierarchies that has seen new forms of political absolutism 
emerge. Within Greens, feminists, anti-racist and separatist movements, it 
is again not diffi cult to fi nd examples of groups who claim epistemic privi-
lege for their own interests. 
The phrase 'the personal is the political' entered the political lexicon in 
the 1960s and it has brought many problems for those seeking to address 
the real nature of the systemic forces that structure world order and the 
appropriate level of political response required to challenge them. In prac-
tice the idea that the personal is the political can lead to an unhealthy form 
of political solipsism in which the political can be defi ned in terms of what-
ever it is that affects one's personal life. This kind of 'identity politics' is an 
inadequate basis for the kind of global solidarity that anti-systemic move-
ments need in their struggles. Politics is a concern with common issues and 
principles underpinning our accounts of the good society, not simply with 
the idiosyncrasies of my own personal grief or anxiety. A successful anti-
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systemic movement has to develop a political lexicon that seeks to overcome 
the differences that animate different anti-systemic movements, enabling 
them to work together in order to achieve their particular ends. There are 
examples at Seattle of the way in which this is at least a possible develop-
ment in the anti-systemic movement. Seattle gave anti-systemic groups with 
specifi c objectives and concerns the opportunity to discuss and communi-
cate their particular interests, with a growing sense of the possibility of soli-
darity emerging over the course of the week. 
Equally, some groups within the anti-systemic movements that have 
emerged in the wake of the 1968 revolutions have adopted a hostility to 
rational inquiry, science, technology and any kind of systemic analysis of 
world order. Such a tendency is, in my view, a severely retrograde step. 
Science and technology are potentially tools that can be used to liberate 
human beings from a great deal of the drudgery of life and are central to 
any humane, ordered society. They are not, in themselves, inherently fl awed 
products of Western culture, or some such thing. As for the issue of ratio-
nal analysis, I would paraphrase Noam Chomsky here who has commented 
that 'I know of no good arguments for irrationality.' In part such tendencies 
have been infl uenced, I suspect, by some of the insights of postmodernist 
attempts to reverse the Enlightenment idea that knowledge is power, poten-
tially a tool for liberation. The power/knowledge equation associated with 
Foucault presents a more Nietzschean and insidious view of knowledge as 
an endless power struggle with one 'regime of truth' ultimately replacing 
another in a circular process of domination (Wilkin, 1999). Suffi ce to say 
this seems a very narrow view of progress and social change which can only 
make sense if we ignore the very real forms of progress that have occurred 
in the world. Issues such as women's rights, human rights, anti-racism, anti-
sexism, gay rights are all developments that represent a movement towards 
a better world order where meaningful rather than simply formal equality 
might yet emerge among all peoples. Knowledge may raise important issues 
of power but this is not to say that all knowledge is simply a form of domina-
tion. On the contrary, knowledge can give us the power to improve social 
relations, as the above examples suggest. The extent to which these ideas 
can be found in some sections of the anti-systemic movements refl ects wor-
ryisome tendencies that will ultimately do little to foster a world where soli-
darity is the bedrock for a good society, rather than power and hierarchy.
Wallerstein, et al, in their work on the anti-systemic movements and the 
1968 revolutions can certainly be criticised for, if not romanticising, then 
underestimating the problems that emerge from this legacy. For a more criti-
cal account of 1968 from someone who wants to defend Enlightenment 
ideals from irrationalist critics it is worth reading Murray Bookchin's recent 
collection of interviews on the 1968 revolutions (Bookchin 1999). I want to 
turn now to the impact of the end of the Cold War and the rise of global 
governance.
The second major long-term development that needs to be considered 
here is the movement from the end of the Cold War through to the emer-
gence of an era of what is increasingly referred to as global governance. The 
latter is more accurately referred to as one of 'neo-liberal global governance' 
and is an attempt to construct a form of world order based upon neo-liberal 
political economic premises. In practical terms the apparent end of the East-
West aspect of the Cold War confl ict has enabled the G7 core capitalist 
states to bring Russia and Eastern Europe fi rmly into line with their own 
political economic agendas for 'good governance'. This has resulted in the 
largely unopposed extension of market principles into ever-wider areas of 
social and economic life.15 The idea of neo-liberal global governance is 
a complex array of policies and institutional developments that serve to 
defend and promote the interests of a coalition of political and economic 
elites against a worldwide series of protests and opposition movements. 
However, it is important to note here that the movement towards a neo-
liberal global political economy begins with the breakdown of the post-war 
Bretton Woods consensus in the early 1970s and the subsequent downturn 
in the world economy. It is a signifi cant development in the eventual emer-
gence of events at Seattle as it is part of the attempt by powerful political 
and economic interests in the core capitalist states to reverse many of the 
gains made by working people around the world in the C20. These gains are 
most fi rmly embedded, perhaps, in the development of welfare states. As the 
1980s and 1990s unfolded, so did the attempt to impose these neo-liberal 
principles on an ever-wider section of the world's population. This, in turn, 
15.  Yes, there is political opposition in Russia and elsewhere in Eastern Europe, but 
as yet they do not have the reigns of power. They are also, worryingly, cultural nationalists 
of an extreme type.
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can be seen as being a major causal factor underpinning the range of anti-
systemic protests that have occurred over the past twenty years, culminat-
ing in the protests at the WTO summit in Seattle. As mentioned before, 
the spontaneity of Seattle was a long time coming. The protests that ensued 
in the 1980s and 1990s can be seen as being generated in response to neo-
liberal political economic changes that have sought to accomplish two main 
tasks: fi rst, to restructure both states and capital; second, to establish 'new' 
norms of social and economic behaviour such as self-reliance and entre-
preneurialism in order to help underpin and provide legitimacy to these 
changes.16 These can be seen as manifesting themselves in all of the follow-
ing, for example: the freeing of capital from labour through the liberalisation 
of fi nance and investment (Sivanandan, 1992); the extension of commodi-
fi cation into ever wider areas of life, including the human body itself; the 
robbing of the agricultural history of developing nations through the 'pat-
enting' of seeds; the erosion of welfare states under the guise of 'reform'; 
the continued exploitation of environmental resources for private profi t; the 
undermining of communal patterns of land-holding; the erosion of workers 
rights; the threat of nuclear confl ict throughout the 1980s (Strange, 1997; 
Kobrin, 1997; Richards, 1997; Gill, 1995 and 1998; Chomsky, 1999). Taken 
together, these political-economic changes represent important diachronic 
development in world order that helps to provide the context in which Seat-
tle as a concrete event emerges. As a number of writers are increasingly com-
menting, the anti-systemic movements can plausibly be viewed as part of 
what Polanyi saw as a 'double-movement' in which society seeks to defend 
itself against the power of markets to disrupt the very possibility of social 
life (Gill, in Hettne, 1995). The idea here is that the concept of a 'market 
society' is logically incoherent because markets and societies are organised 
along antithetical principles. Capitalist markets encourage acquisitiveness 
and the transcendence of private power, while the possibility of social order 
depends upon cooperation, friendship, sympathy, mutual aid and the like.
****
The events at Seattle brought together a range of disparate social move-
ments both in terms of the range of issues that animated distinct groups 
and in terms of their geographical spread. As Elizabeth Martinez notes, 
there was a conscious effort to ensure representation and participation from 
as many parts of the world as possible. For that privileged stratum of the 
world's population hooked up to the Internet, virtually instant updates on 
information, meetings and events could be obtained. Although some of the 
writing on ideas of global consciousness is undoubtedly overstated, it is still 
the case that this protest had world-wide political and economic ramifi -
cations and which brought together a cross-section of the world's diverse 
issue groups and peoples. The importance of Seattle and the WTO in both 
symbolic and political-economic terms cannot be overstressed. For the fi rst 
time, perhaps, protestors were able to organise meetings and debates not 
just amongst themselves but with participants at the WTO. WTO organis-
ers had even arranged public forums to defend themselves from the criti-
cism of the protestors, although as the Seattle press suggested, by and large 
the offi cial spokespeople lost their case (Paulson, 24-9-99; Henwood, 12-99; 
George, 1-2000).17 Whether this was because of the arguments, the audi-
ence or the weight of opposition is not noted! Equally, the protests enabled a 
range of disparate groups to discuss, organise and fi nd grounds for solidarity 
that they might once have thought unlikely, if not impossible. The signifi -
cance of Seattle, then, is that having happened once, it could happen again. 
The hostility of the business press can in part be reasonably interpreted as 
recognition of this fact. Again, though, we need to be careful not to over-
state the events at Seattle as leading to a golden age of anti-systemic pro-
tests (Byers, 2000; Seabright, 2000). That is still to be determined and there 
were many weaknesses and limitations to Seattle, unsurprisingly given the 
relative resources at the disposal of the conference organisers as opposed 
to the protestors. As Elizabeth Martinez notes, the protestors were still 
overwhelmingly white, groups of colour being underrepresented (Marti-
nez, December 2000). The support of the AFL-CIO was largely driven by 
the demands of activists as opposed to the leadership who sought conces-
sions from the WTO rather than total opposition to it (Cockburn, 1999; 
Zinn, 2000; Luthens, December 1999; Henwood, 12-99; Industrial Worker, 
1/2-2000). Already there have been some developments in the U. S. union 
community to turn this into a case for protection of U. S. jobs rather than 
16. And so anti-systemic protest continues (Corporate Watch, 2-2000; The Economist). 17.  WTO Watch; Seattle Daily Journal of commerce; Seattle Times.
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an attempt to link with working people around the world (Bernstein, 2000). 
This development would represent a signifi cant retreat from the possibil-
ities of Seattle. Thus, the events at Seattle brought together a range of 
anti-systemic movements and revealed to them that they do indeed have 
the power to challenge the existing institutional framework that structures 
world order. The weakness of these anti-systemic movements remains the 
same as before, though. Capital and the state have vast resources and greater 
mobility and can continually shift their agendas, their timetables, their strat-
egies, in order to outmanoeuvre their anti-systemic opponents. The price 
of success for anti-systemic movements will be eternal vigilance. As the 
MAI disappears from one agenda it reappears in another under the guise 
of WTO proposals. The key counter-factual question that emerges here for 
the anti-systemic movements is: to what extent can the existing systems that struc-
ture world order accommodate their demands and still remain the same systems? Any 
success that the anti-systemic movements achieve will emerge through some 
form of global solidarity, and in order to evaluate the potential for such a 
development we need to turn to an examination of the systemic properties 
and institutions that stand in the way of such a development. 
iii. continuity and change in a global age
The anti-systemic movements that have emerged since the late 1960s 
and which can be seen to be a central part of the protests at Seattle are 
responding to a range of political-economy changes in world order. These 
changes are encapsulated in the movement from the Cold War to a period 
of global governance, a transition that refl ects both continuity and change 
in world order. The Cold War served to structure world order for a period 
of 50 years during which time a hierarchy of power among the world's 
states was institutionalised primarily along East-West lines. Those states 
that tried to stay outside of this framework invariably found themselves 
dragged into the proxy wars in the Third World that are still a lasting legacy 
of the post-war capitalist reconstruction. More generally, the Cold War also 
helped to solidify existing global social relations to a degree that those anti-
systemic movements that were active in this period often found themselves 
to be on the receiving end of overt state brutality. Dissidents in Eastern 
Europe, nationalists and socialists in South America, Asia and Africa were 
subjected to a range of attacks, imprisonment, murder and subversive prac-
tices by the superpowers and their local elite clients (Chomsky and Herman 
1979a, b). The effect of this was a continual challenge to the possibility of 
progressive social development. Examples of such struggles are many, from 
Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968 to Guatemala in 1954, Iran 
in 1953, and so on. The Cold War offered both the US and its immediate 
allies and the Soviet Union the justifi cation for subverting and destroying 
progressive social movements under the guise of protecting either the 'free 
world' or 'the working classes'. In reality the motivations of each side were 
more mundane. Both superpowers and their allied political, economic and 
military elites sought to retain and extend their own power wherever possi-
ble and for the USA to extend the power of its corporations as actors in the 
global economy. Thus, if we are to understand world order as being about 
global social relations embedded in the complexities of global capitalism and 
the inter-state system, the Cold War was a period where the major institu-
tions and actors sought to solidify and hold back the possibility of progres-
sive social change. The weapons for doing this were varied. Violence was a 
norm in much of the Third World while in times of social crisis such as 
the revolutionary upheavals of the 1960s and early 1970s the core capitalist 
states used violence and subversion on sections of their domestic popula-
tions (Churchill, 1990). 
Of course, the efforts of states to lock social relations into the structure 
of the Cold War was only a limited success. Around the world anti-systemic 
movements pushed progressive issues onto the mainstream political agenda 
and the rise of new forms of political consciousness around sexism, racism 
and the environment increasingly gained ground around the world. Thus, 
while the East-West aspect of the Cold War has moved into abeyance, the 
ideological threat of communism now largely defeated, there are still impor-
tant continuities in world order. First, the hierarchy of states and the struc-
ture that this exerts over world order persists. If anything, that hierarchy 
has been sharpened even further. The Soviet Union (as was) and the former 
Eastern European states have been drawn back into a more traditional role 
in relation to the G7 core capitalist states, that of supplying raw materials 
and cheap labour, often highly skilled. Global governance has amounted in 
practice to a world order led by a hegemonic United States that is able to act, 
in the words of Madeline Albright, 'multilaterally wherever possible, unilaterally 
wherever necessary (Chomsky, 1997: 117). The interests of the United States 
Peter Wilkin46 Solidarity in a Global Age–Seattle and Beyond 47
and its immediate allies continue to shape the exercise of massive military 
power in world order. 18 Second, the hierarchies of global social relations still 
persist. Although anti-sexism and anti-racism have come onto the agenda 
of global politics, progress remains massively uneven, hindered around the 
world by the persistence of cultural nationalist politics, deepening levels 
of inequality and poverty, the erosion of welfare provision, the latter being 
especially harsh in developing countries where it is often only minimal 
anyway. In this respect, world order remains structured by the hierarchies 
of power that shaped the Cold War period. The transition to an era of neo-
liberal global governance has been a crucial feature of the past two decades, 
allowing political and economic elites to construct a global institutional 
framework that allows them to discuss and coordinate political and eco-
nomic policies wherever possible. In practice these developments are both 
a response to what a number of writers in the mid-1970s saw as a 'crisis of 
democracy', the fact that anti-systemic groups were demanding more dem-
ocratic control of political and economic decision-making (Crozier, Hun-
tington, et al, 1979). The effect of these moves towards neo-liberal global 
governance has been to erode the democratic control that people have over 
the institutions that have greatest impact on their daily lives. 
The movement from a post-WW2 world order that was largely shaped 
by what we can loosely call a Keynesian consensus to one of a revived com-
mitment to neo-classical economic theory, what is often called neo-liberal-
ism, is an important development in world order for a variety of reasons. 
First, it represents an important ideological shift in that whereas it was once 
considered normal and important for governments to intervene in at least 
some sectors of the economy and to provide welfare to those on the receiving 
ends of the cyclical crises of capitalism, we have now moved to an era where 
such ideas are considered to be heretical at best, foolish at worst (Thomas, 
1999). The key here, perhaps, was the global economic crisis of the early 
1970s that did so much to discredit the Bretton Woods System and the 
Keynesian ideology that helped to justify it. It is now considered normal to 
allow markets to be extended into ever-wider areas of social and economic 
life where they can effectively regulate themselves through competition and 
the discipline of consumers in the marketplace. Second, these changes are in 
practical terms a direct attack on working people and on democracy itself, if 
by democracy we mean a system in which people are able to exercise some 
degree of meaningful infl uence and control over the institutions and deci-
sion-making processes that shape their daily lives. The establishment of the 
so-called 'Washington Consensus', embedded in the workings of the major 
international fi nancial institutions, serves as a new common-sense ortho-
doxy for any government wishing to attract inward investment in a liber-
alised global fi nancial system. To fail to adhere to the prescriptions of the 
Washington Consensus is to invite a range of disciplinary mechanisms to be 
exercised against your currency, your economy and ultimately your govern-
ment. This can affect governments of both weak and powerful states alike, 
as has been found throughout the past decade in a series of economic crises 
that have ripped through the world economy, from the world-wide depres-
sion of the late 1980s and early 1990s to the failure of the much lauded 
South-East Asian economies in the late 1990s. 
Neo-liberal global governance has led to a number of important shifts 
in global political economy. First, the entrenching of a mixture of policies of 
privatisation, liberalisation, deregulation and protectionism which charac-
terise international trade. Simply put, the core capitalist states have sought 
free trade agreements in areas where their companies might win out, such as 
fi nancial services, intellectual property rights, and so on, whilst at the same 
time practising protectionism in areas where they are potentially vulnerable 
to competition, such as agriculture. In theory, neo-liberalism is a commit-
ment to a 'pure' form of market economy and society. In practice, there is 
little to suggest that political and economic elites actually want such a uni-
versal prescription. On the contrary, what they have sought is a relationship 
with state institutions that enables them to enhance their profi tability, usu-
ally through various forms of public subsidy. Ironically, the Seattle summit 
was primarily sponsored by the U. S. fi rms Microsoft and Boeing, recipi-
ents of major federal subsidies for research and development, and yet also 
18. Interestingly, there has been the occasional glimmer of recognition in the 
mainstream U. S. academia and media that the rest of the world does not share the 
self-perception of the USA's role in world order as that set out by its political elites. 
See Newsweek on anti-Americanism, 31-1-2000. As Newsweek's coverage and subsequent 
letters page response reveal, critiques of U. S. State and corporate power are often taken 
to be anti-Americanism. The failure to recognise this distinction is the knee-jerk response 
of well meaning (and less well-meaning liberals) around the world! See Jonathon 
Freedland's (1999) recent paean to the USA and its institutions.
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curiously regarded as standard bearers of the virtues of rigorous free enter-
prise. 19 Alas, only those fi gures that occupy the ideological institutions of 
the world's free-market think tanks really want free markets, it seems! 
Second, state institutions have been under varying degrees of pressure 
to 'restructure' themselves and their workforces in order to make themselves 
more fl exible in the global economy. This has usually meant pursuing such 
policies as attempting to cut back on those sections of public expenditure 
that do not benefi t the rich and powerful, to undermine trade unions, and 
to subsidise the employment of the unemployed in the private sector. As 
Jacques Maison Rouge, former Chief Offi cer for European Operations of 
IBM and of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development has 
commented, 'the world's political structures are completely obsolete…the critical issue 
of our time is the conceptual confl ict between the global optimisation of resources and 
the independence of nation-states' (Mulgan, 1991: 220). Translated this tells us 
that existing political structures stand in the way of economic effi ciency. In 
practical terms this means that state institutions and governments, those 
bodies that are in varying degrees accountable to the general population, 
however fl awed this might be in practice, are obsolete. This is a quite under-
standable premise if we recognise that in an era of neo-liberal global gover-
nance the criterion for measuring effi ciency is the profi t accruing to private 
fi rms. Recent eulogies to President Clinton are indicative of this premise, 
lauding the fact that 'Americans have never had it so good', whilst at the 
same time, according to the U. S. governments own fi gures, 34.5 million 
people in the USA now live in poverty (Kettle, 1999; Apple jnr, 2000). And 
this is in an era of heightened market effi ciency. Of course, the consistent 
neo-liberal response to such apparent contradictions would be to say that 
the cause of poverty around the world and in the USA is due to not enough 
capitalism and too much government! What people are crying out for, or at 
least they should be if they are rational, is the disciplinary purgative of the 
free market to rid themselves of any latent ineffi ciencies. The fact that the 
world had had centuries of the expansion of capitalism already and that it 
is now scarred with record levels of poverty and deepening inequality is not 
suffi cient evidence to deter neo-liberal theory. On the contrary, it is merely 
proof that capitalism has not gone far enough (The Economist, 12-10-99).
Ironically, the latent totalitarianism of the history of post-war capital-
ism in the Western bloc of the developing world is largely overlooked by its 
defenders. In those countries where the general population foolishly picked 
the wrong kind of government (Guatemala, say, in 1954) that is, a govern-
ment concerned with the needs of the local population rather than the needs 
of major capitalist investors, the population quite literally had to be forced 
to be free. The rational choice is, in practice, to have only one choice! The 
history of post-world war two interventions by the USA and its allies in the 
Third World is one of continual subversion of those governments that failed 
to adhere to pro-capitalist principles (Herman and Chomsky 1979a,b). No 
doubt such mistaken choices can be put down to the lack of education on 
the part of the general population who failed to appreciate the benefi ts that 
would accrue from the rigours of the market place. Rational choices are all 
very well but if people are not smart enough to make the correct ones, then 
it is in their interests to be led by the more enlightened. That is the lesson of 
the spread of liberal, capitalist, democracy around the world (Blum, 1986). 
It has not come about through a global consensus on the 'end of history'. It 
is nice to be able to reassure Francis Fukuyama that his sadness at the end 
of history is somewhat misplaced.20 Liberal, capitalist, democracy has spread 
because its core capitalist proponents have used a variety of undemocratic 
and illiberal tactics to promote it. That is the reality of the spread of liberal 
capitalist democracy, not the triumph of the 'absolute idea' or some such 
metaphysical nonsense, but the extension of the interests and power of 
the political, economic and military elites that dominate the core capitalist 
countries. This used to be called imperialism but is increasingly called glo-
balisation (Wilkin, 1997: 227-228). It has come about because those peoples 
that sought a different path were vigorously forced into line by a variety of 
disciplinary mechanisms. It is diffi cult to fi nd a Third World country in the 
Western bloc during the Cold War that did not endure such disciplines.21
20. Francis Fukuyama, (1989: 18) had this to say …In the post-historical period there will 
be neither art nor philosophy, just the perpetual caretaking of the museum of human history.'
21.  The disciplinary mechanisms take the following forms: Direct force/
intervention by the USA and its allies; Direct force by the domestic state institutions 
against sections of their domestic population; Subversion of governments in the 
Third World by the USA and its allies; Financial attack on Third World States by 19. For recent comment on the ‘bad image’ of MNCs see The Economist, (28-1-00).
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So to that end democratic institutions that might enable people to place 
a different value and meaning on effi ciency, perhaps things such as a good 
society where people can live in dignity, with access to the things that are 
needed to live a decent life (health care, education, culture, and so on), are 
clearly a potential problem for the effi cient working of an economy founded 
on quite different principles. Thus around the world democracy amounts 
to rational choices for electorates between mainstream political parties who 
deviate from the neo-liberal norm more in rhetoric than reality. A good 
example of this can be seen in one of the largest economies of the develop-
ing world, that of Brazil. The 1980s and 1990s saw a number of fi ercely 
contested presidential contests between the Workers Party (PT) and the 
mainstream Party of the Liberal Front (PFL), Party of the Brazilian Dem-
ocratic Movement (PMDB) and the Social Democratic Party of Brazil 
(PSDB). The Workers Party have been led by Trade Unionist Luis 'lula' da 
Silva and have espoused policies that addressed issues of welfare, education, 
health care rights for the poor, and the like. In elections in 1989, 1994 and 
1998 The Workers Party was attacked mercilessly by Brazil's independent 
TV Globo who invariably, in an independent and rational manner, sided 
with the parties of big business (Keck, 1992: 24-29 and 1995; Sader and 
Silverstein, 1991; NACLA, 1995). 22 Despite the fact that the parties of big 
business have been exposed as being hideously corrupt, forcing the resigna-
tion of one president, they still remain the rational choice in an era of neo-
liberal global governance.23 Provided that you understand the fi rst principles 
here, which are that profi t and power for private companies are the ultimate 
public good, then you can make the right choices. If you fail to understand 
this then there are a variety of mechanisms for bringing you around to the 
right way of thinking, as countries as far apart as Vietnam and Haiti have 
found in the 1980s and 1990s. So we can see that in practice the era of 
global governance has both continuities and changes from the period of the 
Cold War which, in geo-political terms, preceded it. These continuities and 
changes are in part driven by the challenge set ruling elites by anti-systemic 
movements in the Cold War period. This is a dynamic system in which 
ruling elites have sought to build transnational alliances wherever possible 
as a means to develop tactics to preserve the existing hierarchies and institu-
tions that structure world order. As such they remain the major obstacles 
to the possibilities of a more just world order that the anti-systemic move-
ments are struggling to bring about. These struggles are increasingly seen as 
taking place in what is invariably referred to as 'global civil society.'
There has been a great deal of talk and writing in the course of the past 
decade on the idea of global civil society (Cox, 1999; Agarwal, 2000). This 
has no doubt been generated by a number of developments in world order: 
the end of the Cold War; the rise of a number of issues of popular concern 
onto the political agenda, such as human rights and the environment; the 
development of communications technology enabling disparate groups to 
organise themselves in an unprecedented manner across time and space. 
capitalists and core capitalist states; Sanctions against Third world states imposed by 
core capitalist states either unilaterally (US and Cuba) or multilaterally (Iraq/Libya); 
Ideological assault on a Third World state (Central America in the 1980s);
Clearly it is possible that at any given time a Third World State might suffer any 
combination of these. 
22. Even calling your party 'The Workers Party' is to invite unwanted attention and 
trouble! The names of political parties are, of course, signifi cant in terms of political 
culture, as we have seen recently in the UK with the re-branding of 'New Labour' under 
the Blair administration. See Robin Ramsey (1998).
23. Lest I be accused of latent eurocentrism here, I am happy to note that corruption 
would seem to be endemic to pretty much all political systems around the world. 
Everywhere from the USA, Germany, Italy, the UK through to Indonesia, China and 
Brazil, corruption is part and parcel of political life. Before neo-liberals get too twitchy 
here, blaming it on those pesky politicians, it is worth noting that corruption takes two, 
invariably commercial and political interests, as the recent scandals affecting Germany 
reveal (The Economist 28-1-2000). What is more interesting in many respects is that the 
real scandal of politics in the era of neo-liberal global governance is one in which the 
interests of private companies are seen as being practically synonymous with the public 
interest. This extends into the formal process of elections (for example, see Julian Borger, 
7-1-2000). The fact that companies can sponsor the WTO meeting at Seattle, buy 
access to ministers and so on, and that this is considered to be normal politics, is quite 
breathtaking. This is a process that we saw with NAFTA when the mainstream media 
and politicians saw nothing wrong with business 'lobbying' of congress to vote to approve 
the treaty, whereas the lobbying by trade unions to represent their members interests 
which they saw as being threatened by NAFTA was an affront to the democratic process. 
For an account of this see Noam Chomsky (1993); Joyce Nelson, (1995); NACLA (1991). 
This ethos says a great deal about the political culture generated by neo-liberal global 
governance.
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What is often overlooked in such debates is that in its current form global 
civil society has largely been a part of the movement towards an era of neo-
liberal global governance. As writers such as Lipschutz have noted, global 
civil society can be seen as a continual part of human history with the move-
ment of people, ideas and resources around the world (Lipschutz, 1992: 
389-420). However, its current form needs to be seen in the context of a cen-
tury marked by increasing state control over the movement of peoples and 
control over the dissemination of information and ideas. The current form 
that global civil society takes can be seen as a new development in that it is 
a space for activity created by changes in the inter-state system and global 
capitalism. The latter is particularly important, as we have seen in the past 
25 years the move towards a global entrepreneurial culture that is central 
to the neo-liberal vision of the good society (Heelas and Morris, 1991). For 
the neo-liberal, global civil society is the realm of the entrepreneur, freed of 
the cumbersome hand of state intervention, able to utilise their talents to 
take risks, innovate, speculate and fuel the economic growth of the 1980s 
and 1990s. The fact that the economic growth of the 1980s and 1990s in 
the core capitalist states from which this ideology has emerged has been no 
better, and probably a little worse, than it was in the 1950s, and even the 
much-despised 1960s and 1970s, is not relevant here.24 Remember, we are 
dealing with faith in idealised models, not the empirical world. 
Thus as Thomas Carruthers has noted in a recent article in Foreign Policy, 
'a well developed civil society can be a natural partner for a successful market econ-
omy' (Carothers, 1999-2000). The modern global civil society has emerged 
in the wake of the declining East-West structure of the Cold War, and has 
refl ected the renewed confi dence of corporate actors in capitalism and their 
ability to exploit the world's resources. In order to do this states have had to 
be persuaded, coerced or cajoled into accepting a series of reforms to their 
own activities and to the activities of private corporations who have sought 
to take advantage of technological innovations and the emergence of poten-
tial markets in the Third World. Thus, as we can see in examples such as the 
USA and the UK, in the core capitalist countries the relationship between 
government and business has been one of mutual support. Businesses tend 
to support those political parties that give them what they want. Surely an 
unsurprising fact of political economy. Similarly, governments seek to nur-
ture and protect successful corporations as a means of bringing success to 
their national economies and ultimately as a means of preserving their polit-
ical authority. In this respect global civil society has been the product of 
the power of political and economic elites to transform aspects of global 
social relations for their own ends. Of course, there is more to global civil 
society than this, as Seattle illustrates. The establishment of neo-liberalism 
as the global credo leaves it open to the concentrated criticisms of anti-
systemic movements. Likewise, the proliferation of new forms of commu-
nication technology as consumer durables also offers a potential means of 
organisation for anti-systemic movements. This was illustrated dramati-
cally in 1994 by the Zapatistas and the Internet propaganda announcing 
their resistance to the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). 
Although it must be recognised that global civil society has largely been 
constructed by changes in state policy that have allowed corporations to 
take advantages of new markets, technology and commodifi cation, it is also 
the case that it creates space within which anti-systemic movements can 
manoeuvre. Nonetheless, in terms of the means and use of communication 
it is important to note that the world's communication infrastructure is 
dominated by a news gathering and disseminating hierarchy that is largely 
North American and European, pro-capitalist media conglomerates whose 
primary interests are profi t not the ruthless criticism of all that exists, to 
coin a phrase.25 Likewise, the new information technology that has been 
developed since the mid-1970s has been utilised by states for surveillance 
24. Global economic growth has slowed by roughly 1/2 since the mid-70s, roughly 
the period when the neo-liberal agenda was beginning to take-off. See Robin Hahnel, 
(1999: 6). As measured by the gini coeffi cient, global inequality has increased steadily 
between countries since the mid-1970s, see Walter Park and David Brat (1995). See 'labor 
today', by Jeremy Brecher, Tim Costello and Brendan Smith, Z Magazine online, for an 
account of the changing patterns of global inequality and the slowing of global economic 
growth since the mid-1970s, at . For recent comment on the ways in which these pressure 
are being felt by sections of the US workforce see Michele Conlin (1999). On global 
poverty and inequality see Stephen Shalom (1999); and The Economist (7-1-00).
25. Christopher Hitchens (1993: 220) has written, 'might it not make sense to regard the 
mass communications industry as an area of contestation, in which the ruling class naturally holds 
most of the cards, but no defi nitively predictable or universalisable result can be arranged?'.
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of populations, by the military for conducting 'scientifi c' warfare, and by 
private companies to gather information and build data bases on consum-
ers. This does not mean that the development of global civil society is not 
important for the potential success of anti-systemic movements. I want 
merely to point out the reality of the obstacles that they face. What we see 
here are the complexities and contradictions in world order that allow anti-
systemic movements the increased space that they need in the post-Cold 
War era to develop their agendas and activities.
In many respects the political agenda in this period remains unchanged. 
The possibility of progressive change in world order must still address con-
cerns laid down by Enlightenment writers about the grounds for solidarity 
and the construction of a rational world order built around the satisfaction 
of human needs and the construction of a meaningfully free social orders. 
The alternative is a tendency that is worryingly prevalent in much of world 
order, a retreat into recidivism and cultural nationalism, erecting the bound-
aries between people based on the nation-state and the friend-enemy dis-
tinction that it bequeaths us. 
conclusions: anti-systemic movements–defending 
democracy and reconciling differences
The possibility of progressive social change faces many fundamen-
tal problems that are both systemic and also specifi c to particular times 
and places. The systemic problems faced by anti-systemic movements are 
fairly clear. First global capitalism remains the contradictory system that 
was Marx's basic and profound insight. Whilst it has released historically 
unprecedented forces of production, producing goods and services in abun-
dance, and has generated untold wealth, it remains a social and economic 
system which has shown itself to be unable to resolve certain fundamental 
social problems. The most obvious here is the overproduction and under-
consumption of goods and services coupled with the uneven spread of devel-
opment. If, as I think that they are, these are systemic problems generated by 
the nature of the social relations that pertain under global capitalism, then it 
is diffi cult to see how they could be resolved without a transformation in the 
organisation, production and distribution of resources. This, of course, has 
been the basic stuff of political ideology in modernity and I see no obvious 
reason to think that this is anything other than a more prescient problem 
than ever. The stark irrationalities of capitalist production for profi t rather 
than the satisfaction of need can be seen in many ways (see Table 1).
The second systemic issue facing anti-systemic movements is the 
continuing legacy of Western political thought and the interstate system. 
Traditional conceptions of political solidarity and obligation have tended 
to be dominated by the relationship between the citizen and the nation-
state (Hutchings, 1999). Internationalism, whether socialist or liberal, has 
historically fl oundered at crucial points when questions of 'national interest' 
are at stake. The power of nationalism as an ideology, an imagined commu-
nity, to bind a group of people together, has proven to be one of the major 
obstacles to a lasting internationalism. This is an insight that classical Real-
ists in international relations have taught us and it is a powerful claim. How-
ever, developments at Seattle and earlier anti-systemic protests that have 
occurred throughout the course of the past three decades are in response 
Table 1. The World's Priorities? (annual expenditure, $USbn)
Basic education for all 6*
Cosmetics in the USA 8
Water and sanitation for all 9*
Ice cream in Europe 11
Reproductive health for all women 12*
Perfumes in Europe and the USA 12
Basic health and nutrition 13*
Pet foods in Europe and the USA 17
Business entertainment in Japan 35
Cigarettes in Europe 50
Alcoholic drinks in Europe 105
Narcotic drugs in the world 400
Military spending in the world 780
Note: *estimated additional annual cost to achieve universal access to basic social services in
all developing countries (Thomas, 1999: 244)26
26. In a way these consumption patterns illustrate Popper's point about unintended 
outcomes. The key question for those wishing to challenge such irrational patterns of 
resource use and allocation is how to alter them without utilising the kind of centralised 
state apparatus that was the undoing of the Soviet system. Given that markets are neither 
effi cient allocaters nor users of resources, a point made by liberal economists like Paul 
Krugman, the key political economy issue for anti-systemic movements is to develop 
alternatives. Needless to say this is a huge point that raises questions about the process 
of social transformation, among many other things. I am inclined to agree with Howard 
Zinn here that lasting social transformation will take time and can only be lasting if it is 
built upon grounds that have substantive roots in popular organisations. 
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to a series of objective changes that have acted to polarise social relations 
around the question of national identity. On the one hand the restructuring 
of relations between global capitalism and the inter-state system has seen the 
emergence of a continuum between more transnationally minded political 
and economic elites and those that remain rooted in particular nation-states 
(cultural nationalists) (Carchedi, 1997). At the same time what Seattle and 
the anti-systemic movements generally indicate is the development of net-
works of global solidarity around a range of issues from human rights to the 
environment, women's rights, the peace movement and trade unions. These 
people in their everyday lives and practices are the potential basis for a trans-
formed world order. At the same time it is glaringly clear that many among 
the grassroots population of the world that have suffered from the systemic 
outcomes of global capitalism and the inter-state system have lurched into 
varied forms of cultural nationalism, which can ultimately manifest itself in 
reactionary political movements. This is a tendency that can be seen around 
the world from the BJP in India to the newly powerful Freedom Party in 
Austria. The obstacles facing anti-systemic movements are immense and 
their success will depend upon a range of factors including ultimately the 
means by which they seek to carry out their political struggles. In this 
respect the battle over the meaning and practice of democracy would appear 
to be the real arena of ideological and political confl ict in the years ahead. 
Is democracy to be increasingly a managed process in which meaningful 
choices are minimised in political and economic systems that offer elector-
ates rational choices between parties that are only interested in managing an 
existing system rather than transforming it?27 Is democracy to be extended 
into the realm of economic organisation so that people can free themselves 
from the role of wage-slaves in global capitalism? The possibility of these 
ideas emerging onto the political agenda is perhaps most liable to emerge 
from the anti-systemic movements as they develop in the years ahead.
However, there is a problem here with the concern for democracy. As 
an editorial in The Economist asked of the protestors at Seattle, 'are they a 
dangerous shift of power to unelected and unaccountable special interest groups?' (The 
Economist, 10-12-99). The rise of anti-systemic movements, as Wallerstein 
et al, note, is in part a response to the perceived failures of parliamentary 
politics to generate lasting progressive social change. The danger here, as The 
Economist notes, is that these groups do not operate largely in the realm of 
representative democracy, which has tended to shape the institutions of the 
world's core capitalist states and is now an increasing phenomenon inter-
nationally (Doyle, 1999). This is a complex issue that I do not really have 
suffi cient space to go into here, so two comments will have to suffi ce. First, 
anti-systemic movements are responding to the failures of representative 
democratic institutions, as they see them. Second, the legitimacy of anti-
systemic movements will depend in part upon their commitment to demo-
cratic practices themselves and in the extent to which they want to render 
democracy more meaningful and substantive. This last point is a diffi cult 
issue to address in a world increasingly structured by political-economic 
institutions and decision-making processes that connect local, national, 
regional and global social relations. One of the great writers on democracy 
in U. S. social science, Robert Dahl, has noted that if societies become eco-
nomically polarised, then democracy can suffer, as politics becomes subordi-
nated to the interests of the rich and powerful (Dahl, 1985; Burchill, 12000). 
This seems to me to be a profoundly important and actually quite obvious 
point. It is worth mentioning here if only because in neo-liberal ideology 
it hardly registers as a problem for democracy at all! Returning to the fear 
expressed in The Economist editorial that the world is somehow at the mercy 
of anti-systemic movements, we can now present a slightly different read-
ing of events at Seattle. As is often the case, what is most interesting here is 
what the business press doesn't see as a threat to democracy. For example, 
when compared with the power of the equally unelected and unaccountable 
corporate interests that paid $9-10 million (US) in 'sponsorship' (a selfl ess 
and public-spirited act, no doubt) one might ask the question where the real 
threat to democracy comes from. That, of course, raises diffi cult questions 
for The Economist and its corporate audience. It is a little ironic that trade 
unions, for example, organisations that exist to defend and promote the 
interests of working people, the general population, are conceptualised as 
27. Even The Economist (12-2-2000) concedes that Europe's currently dominant 
leftist political parties are either severely constrained by capital, are undergoing 
ideological transformations into what Wallerstein describes as liberal-socialist parties, or 
perhaps a combination of both of them. As the Economist notes, 'All governing centre-left 
parties in the euro-zone, constrained by the budgetary rigour imposed by the single currency, now 
follow conservative macro-economic policies.
Peter Wilkin58 Solidarity in a Global Age–Seattle and Beyond 59
'special interests'. This suggests that the interests that working people might 
have in such things as a decent wage, education, welfare, health care, and 
such, are marginal to the real interests of the global economy, which are synony-
mous with the interests of the corporations that dominate it: that is, profi t for 
private institutions. Once that principle is understood then the other points 
raised by The Economist, Business Week, and the other ideological institutions 
tend to fall into place rather more clearly. As I said at the beginning of this 
section the battleground for anti-systemic movements is over the meaning 
and practice of democracy. Is democracy increasingly a process for fuelling 
power and profi t to private corporations, or is it to be something that allows 
people to participate in the institutions and decision-making procedures, be 
they political or economic, that shape their daily lives? (Held, 1995). This 
is the important difference between formal and substantive democracy. 
The liberal concern with procedures lends itself towards a formal analysis 
of democracy where procedures and institutions exist in order to make 
democratic processes theoretically possible, while in practice inequalities of 
social power render them largely empty processes. As Dahl notes, societies 
split by huge inequalities of wealth tend to be vulnerable to the manipula-
tion of the rich and powerful. Formally, democracy exists, substantively 
it is a process in which ordinary people have little opportunity to make a 
substantive difference unless they possess the institutions that enable them 
to organise collectively to do so. For anti-systemic movements the need is 
to make democracy substantive and to challenge the emptiness of formal 
liberal democratic procedures. 28 To return to the example of Brazil again, it 
is clear that much progress has been made in the country by political and 
social movements seeking to challenge the existing structure of political-
economic power and in part this has come about through the success of the 
Workers Party (among others) in national elections. The formal procedures 
of democracy are not irrelevant to social change, far from it. Nor, however, is 
there a straightforward relationship between them. The movement towards 
progressive social change of the kind that animates anti-systemic move-
ments will refl ect the relationship between systemic properties of global 
capitalism and the interstate system as well as the particular and concrete 
circumstances of specifi c places. Indeed, given that formal democracy has 
only really been re-established in Brazil since the 1980s after nearly 20 years 
of brutal military dictatorship, the growth of social and political movements 
around human rights, peasants rights, gender equality, and other anti-sys-
temic issues has been remarkable (Rodrigues, 1995; Tavares, 1995).
Finally, I want to return to the quote that I gave at the beginning of this 
paper from Robin Wright who would respond to the carping of anti-sys-
28 . Mike Moore the Director-General of the WTO failed to address this distinction 
between formal and substantive democracy at the Seattle summit in his address to the 
legislators assembly when he said, ‘I get deeply offended when people say the WTO 
is not democratic. Take the case of the Indian ambassador in Geneva. It takes about 
300 million people to elect a government in India. That government survives at the 
pleasure of its elected MP’s. The government through its Minister, who is accountable 
to cabinet, his Prime Minister, his party, his caucus and to the Parliament and then to 
his electors at home and to the wider vote to enable his government to function. That’s 
accountability. That’s how it should be. And that is how it is for most countries who are 
members of the WTO. The system changes from nation to nation, but the principles of 
accountability are the same. The WTO is member driven, thus driven by governments, 
congresses and parliaments.’ WTO Press Release, 2-12-99. The problems with Moore’s 
defence of the WTO are many but I would draw out three here:
1. All governments do not have equal infl uence in determining WTO policy. The 
WTO is member driven, but not all members were created equal!
2. The chain of accountability Moore outlines is part of what is often referred to as 
a ‘democratic defi cit’. Crucial political-economic decisions around global trade, 
environmental regulation, corporate regulation, labour rights, and so on, are 
increasingly made in institutions far-removed from popular control and scrutiny. 
There is a lack of what Held has referred to as transparency and openness in these 
procedures. To illustrate, the judicial powers of the WTO are a good example 
of just the kind of ‘secretive’ aspects of the WTO that Paul Krugman, among 
others, says do not exist. The WTO’s dispute settlement mechanism allows 
member countries to act on behalf of their own corporations in order to challenge 
the laws, policies and programs of another country, claiming that they are viola-
tions of WTO rules. This process is settled by a panel of unelected experts who 
have the power to hand out economic sanctions in order to force member states 
to conform. These hearings all take place in secret (Paul Krugman take note) 
and the subsequent documents, hearings and briefs remain confi dential. There is 
more but this will suffi ce for the moment.
3. The internal workings of the WTO in its relations with particular members 
is primarily shaped by the power and infl uence of its most powerful blocs, the 
so-called quad Group of Japan, Canada, the USA and the European Union. For-
mally, all members are equal, in practice this is palpably not the case. 
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temic movements at Seattle by asking, 'remember universal brotherhood? You 
know—concern for the world's poor and downtrodden? As Paul Krugman recently 
noted in Slate, free trade gives millions of people a step up the ladder. Yes, that may 
mean working in a sweatshop. But these people manifestly prefer that to their prior 
condition.' Wright's quote inadvertently goes to the heart of the issues that 
separate anti-systemic movements from defenders of the existing world 
order. The only options on offer for the poor of the world, according to 
Wright, are the opportunity to work in a Western TNC sweatshop or to 
remain in even worse poverty. If those are the only options then perhaps 
working in the sweatshop is the rational choice. Again, what is more inter-
esting here is the question that is not asked by Robin Wright and those 
working in the business press and other ideological institutions: perhaps the 
impoverished millions of the current world order would actually prefer something more 
than the opportunity to work in a sweatshop. Perhaps they would like the opportunity 
to discuss, participate and help determine the conditions that shape their daily lives? 
Perhaps, in fact, we all would! Sadly, these would seem not to be the kind of 
rational choices open to us, presumably because the costs are too great for 
cash-strapped corporations to bear. The task of anti-systemic movements 
has and continues to be to ask different questions and to encourage people 
to act upon them questions that want to open up debates about the good 
society and social justice.
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